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CHAPTER I 
NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM 
Note: The Peoples' Commissariat of Defense re-absorbed the Red Navy and was renamed "The Peoples' 
Commissariat of the Armed Forces" in February 1946, and in March 1946 again renamed "Ministry 
of Armed Forces." 
INTRODUCTION 
1. GENERAL 
The most essential element in the national defense 
system of the U. S. S. R. springs from the very nature 
of the totalitarian state. The political, government, 
economic, and military systems of such a state are so 
closely integrated that the same machinery and basic 
processes operate equally well in war and peace. In 
time of war, it is necessary only to shift the already 
totalized effort of the nation from civil development 
to the prosecution of the war. Control of national 
defense derives both advantages and disadvantages 
from centralization of control. Centralization of 
control permits quick changes in policies. It ties 
industrial production to defense requirements. It 
assures adequate financial support for necessary de-
fense projects. Because military requirements are 
given priority over property rights or individual 
claims, it enables maximum utilization of new inven-
tions, scientific discoveries, etc. 
On the other hand, administrative difficulties 
arise in the regulation of the entire life of a nation 
through a huge bureaucracy. Valuable time is lost 
when the approval of many officials is needed for 
even the most minor projects. Great numbers of 
personnel are diverted from productive activity to 
checking, filing, and recording. It is difficult to 
train executives professionally when higher control 
revolves on political rather than professional ques-
tions. Inertia is inherent in the large bureaus. They 
tend to resist change, improvement, and general 
progress. 
2. COMMUNIST PARTY SUPREMACY 
Another fundamental feature of the national defense 
system of the U. S. S. R. is the supremacy of the 
Communist Party, which never has included more 
than 5 percent of the population, over all aspects 
of national life. The constitutional structure of the 
Soviet Union permits absolute control of essential 
executive and legislative machinery through the con-
trol of a limited number of key positions at each 
governmental level. Political supervision of the 
army and the navy as well as civil commissariats en-
sures Party domination of these organizations and 
gives the Party a voice in operational and admin-
istrative decisions, particularly in matters of loyalty 
and appointment of personnel. 
Although the Party, itself, maintains no armed 
forces, it has at its disposal two reliable organizations 
for the suppression of individual dissidence or collec-
tive rebellion. They are the troops and agents of the 
Peoples' Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State 
Security. 
The flexibility of the Communist Party also has 
been a major factor in its continued strength. Party 
members generally are entrusted with all the major 
state offices. The Party constantly reinforces its 
control by extending membership to nearly all per-
sons who distinguish themselves in any field. 
Although the dominence of the Communist Party 
has continued throughout the history of the Soviet 
Union, many of its relationships with the Soviet 
state and the armed forces have changed and fluctu-
ated since 1917. Basic political and propaganda 
doctrines have shifted from an early emphasis on 
international proletarian revolution to a more recent 
emphasis on intense national patriotism. 
Lenin and Stalin have retained their eminent posi-
tion, but Marx and Engels now compete with Peter 
the Great, Catherine, and even Ivan the Terrible for 
doctrinary prestige. A parallel change has taken 
place in the role of the armed forces. Although the 
armed forces were once a political instrument se-
1-1 
TM 30-430 
lected only from the proletariat, they have become, 
since 1939, increasingly an instrument of national 
policy selected from all classes. This development of 
the armed forces as cohesive nonpolitical organiza-
tions with increasing autonomy has been subject to 
considerable fluctuations and reverses. 
The contrast between officers of 1918, who were 
military technicians under the thumb of political 
commissars, and present officers, who are members 
of 3 corps with exceptional authority, is outstanding. 
However, interim reversals and repressions, such as 
the Great Purge of 1937 and the restoration of politi-
cal commissars in 1941 and 1942, also must be 
considered. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF COORDINATION 
The coordination of national defense and the internal 
structure of the Red Army have been developed by a 
trial-and-error process which began even before 
World War I. The authority and degree of inde-
pendence of the various arms demonstrate that, in 
some respects, the national defense system is con-
servative. In other respects, the system has reverted 
to earlier practice after periods of radical experimen-
tation. 
For example, a combined commissariat of defense 
with co-equal divisions for ground, naval, air, and 
supply forces, in existence since early .revolutionary 
days, was abandoned as unsuccessful in 1937 when 
the U. S. S. R. returned to its pre-revolutionary or-
ganization of separate army (including air forces) 
and navy (including naval aviation and coastal de-
fenses). In February 1946, the U. S. S. R. reverted 
to combined armed forces. The navy was re-absorbed 
into the Commissariat of Defense, renamed Com-
missariat of the Armed Forces. 
Many successful innovations of World War I were 
revived during World War II. They include a uni-
fied GHQ for control over both land and sea opera-
tions and an inter-commissariat council controlling 
production, supply, transportation, etc. 
Experience in W orld War II has fostered further 
advances, such as the creation of unified command 
control over rear services and the replacement sys-
tem. The present national defense system of the 
U. S. S. R. combines the lesson of two wars. It 
appears, in general, to be an effective system. 
In a cursory comparison of the Soviet and the 
late German national defense system, a number of 
parallels appear. Among these are the unified 
General Headquarters, the organized r~placement 
army, full separation between the administration of 
1-2 
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officer and enlisted personnel, special armed organi-
zations outside the armed forces for state security 
(the Soviet NKVD and NKGB are comparable to 
the German 55) , and the delegation of major service 
functions to civil organizations (the Soviet Com-
missariats for Rail Transport and Signal Commu-
nications, etc., are comparable to the German T odt 
and Reichsarbeitsdienst). However, in purpose and 
in actual operation, these parallel organizations have 
been profoundly different in the two countries. 
4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
An understanding of the present structure and func-
tioning of the national defense system of the 
U. S. S. R. requires consideration of the historical 
development of a number of major factors. These 
include the coordination of defense, the Supreme 
Command, the professionalization of the Red Army, 
and political control over the Red Army. 
a. Development of the high command and 
administration. The concepts of a coordinated 
direction of civil and military problems in war· and 
of a unified Supreme Command have developed in 
Tsarist Russia and the U. S. S. R. since 1912. At 
that time a GHQ (the Imperial Defense Council I 
was formed to conduct the operations of all land and 
sea forces. The Army General Staff was removed 
from the War Office at the same time and placed 
under the jurisdiction of the GHQ. The War Office 
thus was left free to concentrate on administrative 
matters. 
In 1915, the War Office strengthened its control 
over production, transport, and communications 
with the formation of a Council of Defense, headed 
by the Minister of War and vested with almost un-
limited powers. This council included representa-
tives of industry, the important public bodies, and 
the military, naval, and other departments. Special 
committees were organized for transportation, fuel, 
and supplies. 
The October Revolution of 1917 disrupted these 
organizations. By 1918, however, the new Soviet 
state had re-instituted a comparable structure. The 
Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, headed 
by Lenin, provided central control of policy and 
economic resources. Subordinate to it was the new 
GHQ, or Revolutionary Military Council, headed 
by Trotsky as Commander in Chief and Commissar 
of the Army and Navy. Administrative unification 
of the armed forces other than the security troops 
also followed. By 1924, the Commissariat of the 
Army and Navy presented the following structure: 
1 filar 46 
General Staff of the Ground Forces. 
Main Administration of A~my Personnel and 
Military Schools. 
Main Naval Department. 
Main Department of the Air Forces. 
Main Department of Supply. 
Main Sanitary and Veterinary Department. 
Political Administration of the Armed Forces. 
Between 1934 and 1938, a series of sweeping 
changes promoted military preparedness. In 1937, 
the Council of Labor and Defense, which had sue· 
ceeded the Council of Workers' and Peasant's De-
fense, was relieved of economic functions by the 
Supreme Economic Council, and in over-all military 
policies by the War Council in 1938. To per-
mit more effective technical development of the 
Navy and the specialized arms and to reduce the 
concentration of authority under military command 
after the Purge, the Commissariat of the Army and 
the Navy was split in 1937, both divisions undergo-
ing further internal organizational changes. The 
Revolutionary Military Council, abolished in 1934, 
was replaced in 1937 by the Supreme Military 
Council and the Supreme Naval Council. 
Thus, between 1937 and 1941, the Commissariat 
of Defense emphasized specialization and autonomy 
within its structure. It included the Commissar, 
14 assistant commissars, and the following divi-
SIons: 
Affairs Administration (legal and internal ad-
ministrative affairs). 
General Staff (operations, intelligence, signal 
communications, organization and training, 
air defense, rear areas, mobilization, fuels, 
topographic, historical, and administrative 
divisions) . 
Air Forces Administration. 
Artillery Administration. 
Engineer Administration. 
Signal Administration. 
Antiaircraft Defense Administration. 
Chemical Defense Administration. 
Military Schools Administration. 
Combat Training Administration. 
Personnel Administration. 
Armament Administration. 
Moto-Mechanized Materiel Administration. 
Quartermaster Supplies Administration. 
Military Construction Administration. 
Central Military Cooperative Administration. 
Recreation Administration. 
Sanitary Administration. 
Veterinary Administration. 
Finance Administration. 
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During the first year of the war with Germany, 
it became evident that decentralization had been 
too extensive and that the defense machinery had 
become too sprawling for efficient operation. Con-
sequently, by 1942, changes were effected which vir· 
tually reverted the defense organization to that of 
World War I. A GHQ to determine strategy and 
conduct operations was formed directly under the 
State Defense Committee. It consisted of the key 
personnel of all the armed forces. 
The General Staff was relieved of such administra-
tive functions as mobilization 8,nd rear services, was 
removed from the control of the Commissariat of 
Defense and operationally was pla~ed directly under 
the GHQ. A special organization within the Com-
missariat was formed to administer mobilitation and 
replacement. The combat arms absorbed the devel-
opment and supply functions peculiar to them. Ar-
tillery took over all ammunition and all ordnance, 
except armored. Miscellaneous service functions, 
such as quartermaster supply, cooperatives, recrea-
tion, and the medical, veterinary, and finance serv-
ices, were merged under the Chief of the Rear Serv-
ices of the Red Army. And finally, the appointment 
of a number of key individuals to two, three, and even 
four separate positions of authority guaranteed close 
cooperation between related agencies and helped to 
minimize the tendency toward administrative ineffi-
ciency often characteristic of a bureaucratic struc-
ture. This organization has remained fundamentally 
unchanged up to the present time, except for the 
reabsorption of the Navy. 
h. Changes in status of armed forces. The 
development of the professional and political status 
of the armed forces, particularly of the Red Army, 
has developed along two basic lines. They are the 
growth of a cohesive, centralized standing army in 
opposition to attempted formation of localized forces 
(National Guard), and the gradual reduction of 
direct political control over the army. 
During the Revolution and the Civil War, all pro-
fessional army men were regarded with suspicion 
by the new Soviet regime. Former officers operated 
as "military technicians" under the strict control of 
political commissars. Trotsky, particularly, fa-
vored the ultimate abandonment of a standing army 
and the substitution of a militia from the proletariat. 
Frunze, on the other hand, constantly emphasized 
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the necessity for professional training and the imme-
diate inauguration of a pyramidal program for 
training officers. 
In 1924, a compromise had been reached. The 
strength of the Red Army and Navy was stabilized 
at 562,000. In addition, 150,000 security troops and 
100,000 Frontier Guards were maintained. The rest 
of the available manpower was trained in territorial 
units, serving from 8 to 10 months over a period of 
5 years. The entire army, standing and territorial, 
was increasingly placed on a republican basis, with 
separate forces for the Ukraine, White Russia, 
Transcaucasia and, ultimately, other republics. 
No permanent status was accorded army personnel. 
At the same time, however, the training of the army 
developed gradually along the lines advocated by 
Frunze. As early as 1921, the first class of Soviet 
General Staff officers was graduated from the War 
College. 
This situation continued until 1934, although one 
major change took place in 1928. At that time, par-
ticipation in the armed forces of the U. S. S. R. was 
restricted to members of the working class, others 
being relegated to auxiliary service only. Army 
service became a life-time profession. Concurrently, 
maximum ages in grade were drastically reduced 
to eliminate older and less reliable personnel and 
to provide opportunity for younger Soviet officers. 
From 1935 on, an increasingly tense situation 
forced gradual abandonment of the territorial system. 
All territorial units were placed on a full standing 
status by 1939. Increasing demands for manpower 
in the army led to the widening of conscription. 
In 1939, the principle of armed service by all citi-
zens, as embodied in the constitution of 1936, was 
promulgated in the universal service regulations. 
The need for mobility and flexibility of the army also 
led to the merging of all republican units into a single 
force. 
The separate status and prestige of officer per-
sonnel increased with the growth of the army. In 
1935, officer ranks were re-introduced, including the 
new title of "Marshal of the Soviet Union." In 1940, 
even the formerly hated title of "General" was 
resumed. 
This trend was accelerated during the war with 
Germany. In 1943, officers' epaulets were authorized 
and the term "officer," itself, returned. Even in the 
official military press, comparisons were made with 
the Czarist officer corps. Increasing emphasis was 
placed on the military, social, and political leader-
ship of the Soviet officer and on military life as a 
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permanent profession. At the same time, responsi-
bility for the loyalty of its members apd for the inter-
nal security of the army was transferred in its en-
tirety to the Red Army. Thus, with the conclusion 
of World War II, the Red Army reached the peak 
of its prestige as a professional permanent group. 
The history of political control over the armed 
forces has varied with changes in their status and 
prestige. In general, tight political control has coin-
cided with periods of disaster and uncertainty; loos-
ening of control with confidence and victory. 
From the Revolution of 1917 until about 1923, the 
high command of the Red Army was vested in a group 
of Communist Party leaders. The heterogeneous 
units and formations which constituted the Red Army 
were commanded by "Party men." These political 
leaders were called War Commissars. The military 
officers, then termed "military specialists," played 
only a subordinate role. Credit was given the War 
Commissars for the successes of the Red Army in 
dealing with counterrevolutionary forces and general 
unrest. Lenin said, "Without the War Commissars, 
we should never have had a Red Army." 
After 1923, when calm had been restored in So-
viet Russia, it was decided to hand control of 
the Red Army over to the military to create an effi-
cient and well-trained force. The high command 
was composed of military officers of political relia-
bility. In those units and formations in which the 
senior army officer was considered politically reli-
able, the commissars were abolished. The test of 
political reliability was Party membership or, at the 
least, sympathy with the Communist Party. Such 
officers became commanders, and assistants respon-
sible for political work in the unit or formation were 
assigned to them. War Commissars, who were con-
sidered to have acquired sufficient military experi-
ence during the revolutIonary wars, in some cases 
became commanders. By about 1936, every unit 
and formation of the Red Army had a military 
commander. 
All units and formations of the Red Army again 
were allotted specially selected political commissars 
following the treason trials of 1936-1938. This was 
carried out in all cases, regardless of the political 
reliability of the commander in questioJ1e The 
newly appointed commissars countersigned all orders 
of the commander and thus had veto power on all 
decisions. 
During the Finnish Campaign of 1939-1940, it 
was found that considerable difference of opinion 
existed between commanders and commissars. The 
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commissars used their powers to interfere with purely 
tactical decisions, about which they had insufficient 
knowledge. Reverses in the field resulted. Accord-
ingly, in 1940, commissars were abolished for the 
second time and were reduced to the status of assis-
tant commanders for political matters. Among mili-
tary commanders, no distinction was made on the 
basis of Party membership. 
The Political Administration of the Red Army 
was renamed the Main Political Administration. 
Former Commissars of Red Army and Party mem-
bers were required not only to disseminate propa-
ganda and instruction inside the army, but also to 
help to increase Red Army prestige among the civil-
ian population. 
The rna j or reverses which followed the initial 
German offensive against the Soviet Union (1941-
1942) led to the reinstitution of the commissars to 
restore the morale, discipline, and patriotism of the 
Army. The commander remained the head of the 
unit or formation and the commissar became, to 
quote the official directive, its "Father and Soul." 
The commissar was required to suppress any 
trace of treasonable or counterrevolutionary activi-
ties, to maintain the morale and patriotism of the 
troops, to supervise propaganda and political work, 
and to support the commander in carrying out 
operational plans. He was responsible, equally with 
the commander, for maintaining the "fighting 
strength of the troops." The power of veto, previ-
ously mentioned, was revived. This special posi-
tion of the commissars, most of whom had no mili-
tary experience, caused serious personal friction 
between them and the professional military com-
manders. 
In October 1942, when the military situation was 
critical, Stalin decided that all other considerations 
should give way to purely military interests. Ac-
cordingly, for the third time, the abolition of com-
missars was ordered. They reverted to the status 
of assistant commanders for political matters, or 
chiefs of political administrations and departments 
of armies and fronts. They were given appropriate 
military ranks. These were equivalent, in divisions 
and lower commands, to that of the chief of staff. 
Commissars were, in most cases, required to at-
tend courses in basic military subjects. They were 
not expected to be able to command the units or for-
mations to which they belonged. Although they 
assisted with military training~ they did not share 
tactical responsibility with the commanders. Polit-
TM: 30-430 
ical control of military command within the armed 
forces has continued on this basis to the present. 
5. FUTURE TRENDS 
A number of major changes have occurred and 
will occur during the transition of the U. S. S. R. 
from war to peace. The State Defense C.)mmittee 
was dissolved in September 1945. It may be that this 
will be followed by the dissolution of the GHQ and 
that the General Staff will be returned to a status of 
full subordination to the Peoples' Commissariat of 
Defense. Responsibility for mobilization and re-
placement probably will revert to the General Staff as 
it becomes more of a planning and less of an admin-
istrative function. The unification of rear services 
and the extensive functions of the arms probably 
will continue. 
All evidence indicates retention of independent 
status by the security forces (NKVD and NKGB). 
It is to be expected that there will be greater inde-
pendence for the air arm. It is a distinct possibility 
that the growing importance of the air forces and 
the expansion of their proportionate strength may 
lead to the emergence of a separate commissariat 
for air. Of all the arms, air is certain to witness the 
most sweeping revisions in organization, equipment, 
and techniques. A trend that is worthy of note is the 
diminishing frequency of subordination of support-
ing air units to lower echelon command headquarters 
in favor of army or army group control of ever 
greater masses of tactical air power. 
Tighter political control will unquestionably be 
reestablished over the Red Army, both through 
intensive indoctrination of its members and through 
complete elimination of possible unreliable elements. 
Another measure designed to lessen the concerted 
power of army leadership is the constitutional change 
of 1944 which transforms the Peoples' Commissariat 
of Defense from an All-Union to a Union-Republican 
commissariat, with subordinate commissariats for 
each of the republics. There is little evidence that 
this change is taking place, except for the organiza-
tion of Republican Commissariats of Defense by the 
Ukrainian and White Russian S. S. R's. In fact, the 
latest organization of the military districts (1946), 
which cuts across republic boundaries, may be con-
sidered a negative indication. 
Correspondingly, possible reintroduction of a ter-
ritorial system is not to be anticipated when consid-
eration is given to the mass drive, at the end of the 
war, to re-enlist the maximum number of noncom-
missioned officers in the Red Army. 
1-5 
TM 30-430 I Mar 46 
PART I. THE STATE, THE PARTY, AND THE ARMED FORCES 
Section I. U. S. S. R. CONSTITU-
TIONAL STRUCTURE 
The constitution of the U. S. S. R. (1936) vests 
the highest legislative and executive powers of the 
nation in the Supreme Soviet, a representative body 
of two chambers. Representation in one chamber, 
the Soviet of the Union, is based on one deputy per 
each 300,000 population. The other chamber, the 
Soviet of Nationalities, draws its representation on 
the basis of 25 deputies from each of the Union 
Republics, 11 from each Autonomous Republic, 5 
from each Autonomous Oblast, and 1 from each 
national Okrug. 
In peacetime, the Supreme Soviet meets biannually, 
each session lasting approximately 1 week. Between 
sessions, the powers of the Supreme Soviet are dele-
gated to the Presidium, which is elected by both 
chambers sitting in joint session. The Supreme 
Soviet or the Presidium appoints the commissars of 
the All-Union and Union-Republican commissariats. 
These collectively form the Soviet or Council of 
Peoples' Commissars, the chief executive and admin-
istrative body of the state. 
The Council of Peoples' Commissars consists of 
the heads of 24 All-Union commissariats which have 
no counterpart within the republics, 22 Union-Re-
publican commissariats which have counterparts 
within the republics and operate, at least theoreti-
cally, through them, and approximately 15 main ad-
ministrations and committee chiefs of commissariat 
importance. 
For more efficient operation, this unwieldly body 
delegates its powers to a smaller number of councils 
and committees. Especially are they delegated to 
the Supreme Economic Council and its subordinate 
organizations for defense industries, such as metal-
lurgy and chemistry, machinery production, fuel and 
electricity, agricultural procurement, and consumer 
goods. 
Between 1941 and its dissolution at the end of 
World War II, the State Defense Committee of the 
Council of Peoples' Commissars was the highest oper-
ating committee, and constituted a virtually all-
powerful body under the direction of Stalin, Chair-
man of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, Commis-
sar of Defense, and Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces (fig. 1). 
The administration of justice is vested in the Su-
preme Court as the highest judicial organ of the 
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U. S. S. R. It supervises all courts of the U. S. S. R. 
Courts are established by the Supreme Soviet for all 
political divisions of the nation. The Supreme 
Court and special courts with All-Union jurisdiction 
are staffed by appointees of the Supreme Soviet. 
The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court is 
especially charged with the administration of justice 
within the armed forces. It supervises the entire 
system of military courts through the Chief Pro-
curator of the Commissariat of Defense. 
Section II. THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
More important than the formal governmental 
structure is the Communist Party. The existence of 
the Party is specifically authorized in the 1936 Con-
stitution as essential to the preservation and protec-
tion of the foundations of the state. Although the 
formation of trade unions, cooperative associations, 
youth organizations, and cultural, technical, and sci-
entific societies is an ensured right of the people and 
such organizations may nominate candidates for 
election to the Supreme Soviet and other bodies, "the 
most active and politically conscious citizens in the 
ranks of the working class and other strata of the 
workers unite in the Communist Party of the 
U. S. S. R." These provisions guarantee an unchal-
lengeable position for the Communist Party, and 
render opposition to it illegal. 
Because the Communist Party is the only organized 
political entity in the U. S. S. R., it alone can provide 
the trained personnel for key government positions. 
Domination by the Party is further assured by the 
fact that the Supreme Soviet and the comparable 
local legislative bodies are very large and meet but 
infrequently for brief periods. Consequently, not 
only is interim power delegated to the corresponding 
Presidia, but so is the actual review and control of 
executive activities. Additional concentration of 
power is facilitated by the Soviet practice of assign-
ing multiple correlated positions to the same indi-
vidual. 
Internally, the Communist Party consists of a cen-
trally-controlled hierarchy which is ultimately based 
on small semi-secret "cells" in every part and organi-
zation of the U. S. S. R. This network maintains its 
own direct communications, independent of the 
state. Discipline within the Party is strict, and devi-
ation from authorized doctrine or policy is followed 
by immediate expulsion or other punishment. 
Every possible measure is applied to give the Com-
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munist Party maximum political, social, and eco-
nomic prestige. It is given credit for every type of 
successful national achievement. Persons in the 
U. S. S. R. who distinguish themselves in any way 
are solicited for membership. The Party is per-
mitted to criticize inefficiency or political deviations. 
In short, the Communist Party attempts to maintain 
itself as an elite ruling class directing the state, but 
apart from an·d above it. 
Another vital source of power of the Communist 
Party is its legally-sanctioned political tutelage of 
the armed forces. Its control over the security 
forces (NKVD and NKGB) and the Navy has been 
markedly effective at all times. Party control over 
the Red Army, although subject to major fluctua-
tions in the past, still is pronounced. Supervision of 
the effectiveness and loyalty of individuals, of their 
training status, and of their morale, are functions 
of the Main Political Administration of the Red 
Army. The Main Political Administration of the 
Red Army reports directly to the Communist Party. 
Dl:1ring World War II, the Communist Party was 
in complete charge of all partisan operations. 
A final source of power is the control by the Com-
munist Party of the youth of the U. S. S. R. The 
Komsomols, or League of Communist Youth, the 
Pioneers, and the Octobrists cover even the youngest 
age groups and provide the major outlet for their 
constructive play and social activities. 
Section III. ARMED AND AUXILIARY 
FORCES 
1. GENERAL 
The armed and auxiliary forces of the Soviet Union 
are of three types: military, semi-military and civil 
(militarized in time of war) . The military forces 
include the Red Army and its air forces, and the 
Red Navy and its air component. The semi-military 
armed forces are the troops of the Peoples' Commis-
sariats of Internal and State Security. These include 
frontier and internal guards, local police, and other 
armed components for the security of the nation in 
time of peace or war. 
The entire strength of certain other organizations 
is mobilized in direct support of military operations 
in time of war. Militarized during World War II 
were the Peoples' Commissariats of Transportation, 
Maritime Fleet, River Transport, and Signal Com-
munications, as well as the Main Administrations 
of the Civil Air Fleet and the Northern Sea Route 
and their operating and maintenance personnel. 
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Their authority and operations extended not only 
throughout the Soviet Union, but well into the zone 
of operations. Uniformed personnel of these civil 
organizations were subject to military law and dis-
cipline but, in all areas, remained under the direct 
control only of their respective commissariats or 
main administrations. (For these and other civilian 
organizations which were armed or mobilized for 
World War II, see Chapter IV.) It is important to 
note in this connection that the SovIet concept is that 
all citizens are equally liable for service in the mili-
tia. if not in the regular military forces. 
No one of these forces can be called a special in-
strument of the Communist Party. In striking con-
trast to the methods of the National Socialist Party 
in Germany during the period of its development and 
greatest success, the Soviet Communist Party has 
never been an armed force in itself. Nor has the 
Communist Party ever permitted one of the armed 
forces of the Soviet Union to come into conflict 
with another as a specially favored instrument of 
the Party. 
A carefully exact division of responsibility and 
authority between the troops of the Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs (NKVD ) and the troops (Red 
Army) of the Commissariat of Defense (NKO) has 
been firmly established and jealously protected by 
the Soviet government. The Great Purge of the Red 
Army and its command in 1937 was inspired by the 
NKVD, as Party custodian of the internal security 
of the state. It is significant, however. that the Purge 
was conducted by due process of law involving the 
entire governmental structure, rather than by the 
troops of the NKVD alone. 
2. COMPONENTS OF HIGH COMMAND 
Throughout the Red Army and Navy, a distinct divi-
sion exists between command channels and agencies 
and administrative channels and agencies. (For 
administrative channels and agencies, see Part III.,) 
The "high command" of the armed forces em-
braces all agencies in the chain of operational com-
mand for all elements of the army and the navy. 
It includes, under the State Defense Committee, the 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his 
General Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff 
of the Red Army, the Supreme- Naval Council, the 
Commissariat of the Navy, and the Naval Staff. 
Army command stems from the General Head-
quarters. It extends through the Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff of the Red Army to army groups and other 
field forces. (See Part II.) 
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Naval command also stems from the General 
Headquarters. It 6Xtends through the Supreme 
Naval Council, the Commissariat of the Navy, and 
the Naval Staff to the active naval units. The four 
commissariats of the Armed Forces (Defense, Navy, 
Internal Affairs [NKVD], and State Security 
[NKGB] maintain administrative and technical con-
trol, but were subordinated in varying degree in 
policy questions to the GHQ during World War II. 
With the end of the war and the dissolution of the 
State Defense Committee, it is believed that the re-
spective commissariats have again become dominant 
and increasingly autonomous. It is not certain 
whether GHQ for all the armed forces will be con-
tinued or whether the independent Supreme Military 
Council of the Army will be revived as the indi-
yidual components of the armed forces regain their 
independence. 
3. THE RED ARMY 
The chief components of the Red Army are the mili-
tary districts and the field forces (active army). 
a. Military districts. The military districts 
comprise the basic zones of the interior organization 
of the U. S. S. R. They are responsible directly to the 
Peoples' Commissariat of Defense. For replacement 
purposes, they are controlled by the Main Adminis-
tration for the Formation and Equipment of Units. 
In the last 20 years, the number of military dis-
tricts has increased steadily while their average area 
has decreased steadily. A more simple and efficient 
organization has thus become possible. There now 
are 30 military districts (figs. 2 and 3) . 
Each district is directed by a commander and a 
military council. Each is capable, on the average, 
of raising an infantry army in the first echelon of 
mobilization. 
Territorially, the military districts coincide with 
the Oblasts of the U. S. S. R. Although military dis-
tricts may include more than one Oblast, their bound-
aries do not cross those of the Oblast. No relation 
with the Union-Republics exists (fig. 4). The basic 
operating element of the military districts is the 
county (rayon), although the more densely popu-
lated districts may have intermediate (sub-district) 
control organizations. 
The responsibilities of the military districts are 
as follows: 
Conduct combat and political training. 
Ensure mobilization readiness of troops, trans-
port, and signal communications. 
Conduct the replacement program. 
TM 30-430 
Study and select command and administrative 
officers, other than general officers or officers 
of front-line units. 
Maintain constant check over the loyalty of all 
personnel. 
Conduct counterintelligence. 
Ensure the requisition, procurement, storage, 
and movement of supplies, and of medical and 
veterinary facilities. 
Supervise antiaircraft defense, including passive 
measures of the civil population. 
Supervise pre-military training and draft board 
activities. 
Guide defense construction work. 
Ensure proper civil-military coordination 
within the district. 
h. Field forces. In the field forces of the Red 
Army, the basic division is not so much a separation 
of the ground and air components as a separation of 
tactical from strategic forces. 
The tactical forces of the Red Army are composed 
of army groups (fronts), each embracing a number 
of air and ground armies and other components 
The number and size of army groups varies. In 
1943, for example, there were 17, but the number 
had been reduced to 7 shortly after the close of the 
war with Japan. The seven were as follows in Jan-
uary 1946: 
Group 
In Eli'Tope: Location 
Northern Group ______________ Old and new Poland. 
Central Group ________________ Austria, Hungary. 
Southern Group ______________ Bulgaria, Rumania. 
Occupation Group, Germany ___ Germany. 
In the Far East: 
Trans-Baikal FronL __________ Trans-Baikal Military 
District, Outer Mon-
golia, Eastern Man-
churia. 
Second Far Eastern FronL ____ Khaborovsk Krai, 
Nor the r n Man-
churia. 
First Far Eastern FronL ______ Maritime Krai, West-
ern Man c h uri a, 
Northern Korea. 
An army group (front) consists basically of t.wo 
or more infantry armies, one to two air armies, a 
tank corps, a mechanized corps, and artillery, mortar, 
rocket, and antiaircraft divisions. (For detailed or-
ganization of army groups, see Chapter III) 8 
The strategic forces of the Red Army also are 
ground and air formations. The principal ground 
components are tank armies, artillery corps, and for-
tified areas. Certain of the fortified areas are under 
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• Headquarttrs of Milit4r~ Distrkb 
o Unconfirmtd Headquarttrs 
-- Soundor;es of Militor~ Districts 
.......... Unconfirmed J;oundariu 
Figure 2. Military districts of. the U. S. S. R. (Western area). 
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Military districts Headquarters Political components 
White Sea. . . . . . . . .. Kemi (?) . . . . . . . . . .. Petsamo (?), Murmansk Oh., Karelian A. S. S. R., Archangel Oh., Komi 
A. S. S. R., Nentso Nat'I. Ok. 
Leningrad. . . . . . . . .. Leningrad.......... Leningrad Oh., Vologoda Oh. 
Baltic. . . . . . . . . . . . .. Riga.............. Estonian S. S. R., Latvian S. S. R. 
Special. . . . . . . . . . . .. Koeningsherg (?). . .. Lithuanian S. S. R., Koeningsherg area (?) 
Minsk. . . . . . . . . . . . .. Minsk............. Be!orussian S. S. R., Vitehsk Oh., Minsk Oh., Mogilev Oh., Polesye Oh., 
GomelOh. 
Lvov. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Lvov.............. Lvov Area (?). 
Carpathian. . . . . . . .. (?)................ Moldavia. 
Kiev. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Kiev.............. Zhitomir Oh., Kiev Oh., Chernigov Oh., Kamenets-Podolsk Oh., Vinnitsa 
Oh. 
Odessa. . . . . . . . . . . .. Odessa............. Odessa Ob., Kirovograd Oh. 
Moscow. . . . . . . . . . .. Moscow ......... ·.. Kalinin Ob., Yaroslavl Ob., Smolensk Ob., Moscow Ob., Tula Ob., Ryazan 
Ob. 
Gorkii .............. Gorkii ............. Ivanovo Ob., Gorkii Oh. 
Voronezh. . . . . . . . . .. Voronezh.......... Voronezh Ob., Tambov Ob. 
Ore!. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Orel............... Ore! Ob., Kursk Ob. 
Kharkov. . . . . . . . . .. Kharkov........... Sumy Ob., Dnepropetrovsk Ob., Poltava Ob., Kharkov Oh., Stalino Ob., 
V oroshilovgrad Ob. 
Tauric. . . . . . . . . . . .. Simferopol......... Nicolayev Ob., Zaporozhiye Ob. 
Kazan. . . . . . . . . . . .. Kazan............. Kirov Ob., Tatar A. S. S. R., Churvas A. S. S. R., Mari A. S. S. R., Udmurt 
A.S. S. R. 
Volga. . . . . . . . . . . . .. Kuihyshev......... Penza Ob., Kuibyshev Ob., Saratov Ob., German-Volga A. S. S. R., 
Mordva A. S. S. R. 
Steppe. . . . . . . . . . . .. Stalingrad.......... Stalingrad Ob., Kalmyk A. S. S. R. 
Don. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Rostov............ Rostov Ob. 
Kuhan. . . . . . . . . . . .. Krasnodar......... Krasnodar Krai (containing Adyghey Aut. Oh.). 
Stavropol. . . . . . . . . .. Voroshilov......... Ordzhonikidze Krai, North Ossetian A. S. S. R., Karachavev Aut. Oh., 
Chechen-Ingushian A. S. S. R., Kahardino--Balkar A. ·S. S. R., Cir-
cassian Aut. Ob. 
Tillis. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Tillis.............. South Ossetian, Aut. Ob., N akhichevan A. S. S. R., Adzharian A. S. S. R., 
Armenian S. S. R., Abkhazian A. S. S. R., Georgian S. S. R. 
Baku .............. Baku .............. Kaghistan A. S. S. R., Azerhaidzhan S. S. R., (containing Nagarno-
Karahakh). 
Ural. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Sverdlovsk (?). . . . .. Komipermyak Oh., Perm Ob., Sverdlovsk Oh., Chelyabinsk Ob. 
South Ural. . . . . . . .. Chkalov........... Bashkir A. S. S. R., Chkalov Oh., West Kazakhstan., Aktyubinsk Oh., 
Guryev Oh. 
Central Asia (?). . . .. (?)................ North Kazakhstan Ob., Kustanay Oh., Akmolinsk Ob., Pavlodar Oh., 
East Kazakhstan Ob., Semipalatinsk Ob., Karaganda Oh., Alma-Ata Oh. 
Turkestan. . . . . . . . .. Tashkent.......... Kara-Kalpak A. S. S. R., Kzyl-Orda Oh., Dzhampul Ob., South Kazakh-
stan Ob., Kirghiz S. S. R., Osh Oh., Dzhalal-Ahad Oh., Frunze Oh., 
Tyanshan Oh., Issyk-Kul Oh., Uzhek S. S. R., Samarkand Oh., Tash-
kent Ob., Fergana Ob., Tadzhik S. S. R., Leninahad Ob., Stalinahad 
Ob., Kulyah Oh., Gorm Oh., Gorno-Budakhshan Aut. Oh., Krasnovodsk 
Ob., Turkmen S. S. R., Tashauz Oh., Khorezm Ob., Mary Oh., Chardz-
hou Ob., Bukhara Ob. 
West Siberia ........ Novosihirsk ........ Omsk Ob., Yamalo-Nentso Nat'I. Ok., Ostyako-Vogul Nat'l. Ok., Novosi-
hirsk Ob., Altai Krai Oirot Aut. Oh. 
East Siberia ........ Irkutsk ............ Krasnoyarsk Krai., Taimyr Nat'l Ok., Evenki Nat'l Ok., Irkutsk Oh., 
Ustordo-Buryant Mongolian Nat'l Ok., Khakass Aut. Oh., Tannu Tuva. 
Trans-Baikal. ....... Chita .............. Chit a Ob., Aghinskaye-Buryat Mongolian Nat'l. Ok., Buryat Mongolian 
A. S. S. R., Yakutsk A. S. S. R. 
Far East. .... '" ... Khaharovsk........ Chukotsk Nat'l Ok., Koryak Nat'l Ok., Kamchatka Oh., Khabarovsk 
Krai., Lower Amur Ob., Amur Ob., Jewish Aut. Oh., Ussuri Oh., Pri-
morsk Krai. 
Abhreviations used in ahove list: 
A. S. S. R.-Autonomous Sovie~ Socialist Republic. 
Aut. Ob.-Autonomous Oblast. 
Nat'l O' .-National Okrug. 
Oh.-Obtast. 
S. S. R.-Soviet Socialist Republic (Union-Republic). 
NOTE.-The hounJaries, names, and headquarters of most of the military districts are well estahlished. However, 
the existence of the Orel and Central Asia Military Districts is uncertain, and the boundaries of the Tauric, Leningrad, 
B~ltic, and South Ural Military Districts are unconfirmed. It is possihle that Estonia is a part of the Leningrad Military 
District, and Lithuania is a part of the Baltic. Thus the Special Military District includes only East Prussia. 
Figure 4. Political components oJ military districts of the U. S. S. R. 
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naval rather than army command. Other strategic 
forces are the Civil Air Fleet, the Long·Range 
Bomber Force (an air army), and the PVO, or Air 
Defense Force. 
The PVO is a separate part of the Red Army only 
in its operating elements. Its headquarters is 
charged with coordination of the administrative 
supervision, by the Commissariat of Internal Affairs 
(NKVD), over passive civil defense measures and 
the administrative supervision of the antiaircraft, 
fighter, and air·warning systems. The latter admin· 
istration is accomplished by the appropriate main 
administrations of the Commissariat of Defense. 
In combat zones, PVO forces are organized into 
the defense fronts, consisting of antiaircraft and 
fighter armies, for the protection of major targets. 
PVO fronts have direct command of the air observa-
tion, signal intercept, early warning, and signal com-
munications systems and operations in their zones. 
Elsewhere in the U. S. S. R., PVO operations are 
controlled on the basis of military districts. In each 
district, this is accomplished by an Air Defense 
Force Staff. 
4. THE RED NAVY 
a. High command. The high command of 
the Soviet Naval Forces differs from that of the Red 
Army in that the Commissariat of the Navy 
(NKVMF) has remained a link in the operational 
chain of command. Under the command of the Gen-
eral Headquarters, the Supreme Naval Council is the 
highest authority over naval operations and affairs 
and is comparable to the Military Council of an army 
or army group. The Commissariat of the Navy is 
directly subordinate to the Supreme Naval Council. 
The chief agencies within and subordinate to the 
Commissariat are: the Naval Staff, with divisions 
Commissariat of Defeme 
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similar to those of the Army General Staff, but in-
cluding a Hydrographic Division; the Coastal De-
fense Force; and various service and administrative 
offices comparable to those in the Commissariat of 
Defense. Included are an Administration for Naval 
Education, a Main Political Administration, a Sig-
nal Communications Administration, and the Office 
of the Surgeon General. 
h. Forces under command. In time of war, 
the naval high command controls, in addition to 
naval forces, the Peoples' Commissariat for the Ship-
building Industry, the Chief Administration of the 
Northern Sea Route, and the Maritime Fleet. 
The Soviet Navy is organized into fleets and 
flotillas as follows: 
The Northern Fleet. 
The Black Sea Fleet. 
The Pacific Fleet. 
The North Pacific Fleet. 
The Azov Flotilla. 
The Dnieper Flotilla. 
The Amur River Flotilla. 
The Sungari River Flotilla. 
The Danube Flotilla. 
A number of fortified areas along the coasts of 
the U. S. S. R. are under exclusive control of the 
naval command. Examples are the White Sea De-
fense Area and the Vladivostok Defense Area. 
Section IV. CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONSHIPS 
1. GENERAL 
The readiness of a totalitarian state for total mobili-
zation and the extent to which it became a reality in 
the U. S. S. R. during World War II has already 
Civil Government 
Main Administration of the Air Forces ................. Commissariat of Aviation Industry. 
{Commissariat of Armaments. Main Administration of Artillery Troops. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Commissariat of Mortar Armaments. 
Commissariat of Munitions. 
Main Administration of Tank and Mechanized Troops. .. Commissariat of the Tank Industry. 
Main Administration of Signal Troops ................ " Commissariat of Signal Communications. 
Main Administration of Chemical Warfare Troops. . . . . .. Commissariat of the Chemical Industry. 
Main Administration for Antiaircraft Defense ......... " Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). 
Main Administration of Railway Transport ............. Commissariat of Transportation. 
Main Administration for Intendance Service. . . . . . . . . . .. Council for Consumers Goods. 
Main Administration for Supply of Rations. . . . . . . . . . . .. Council for Agricultural Procurement. 
Main Administration for Road Construction. . . . . . . . . . .. Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). 
Main Administration for Medical Services. . . . . . . . . . . . .. Commissariat of Health. 
Main Administration for Personnel ........ } {Central Administration for Labor Reserves. 
Main Administration for the Formation and ........... Central Administration for Registration and Distri-
Equipment of Units. Lution of Labor Forces. 
M · Ad ., ." C . II' {Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). aln mInistratIOn lor ountennte Igence. . . . . . . . . . .. C . . f S S . (NKGB) ommlssarlat 0 tate. ecurIty • 
Figure 5. Parallel agencies, military and civil, to promote close coordination. 
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been discussed. The closest cooperation betweeI\. 
the armed forces, and their control agencies, and 
the entire structure of the civil economy was pro-
vided and enforced by the central government 
(fig. 5). 
2. MILITARIZATION 
The wartime position of such semi-military organi-
zations as the troops of the Commissariats of Internal 
Affairs and State Security and of such civil organiza-
tions as those of the Commissariats of Transporta-
tion and Signal Communications also has been dis-
cussed. (For further detail concerning them, see 
Chapter IV.) These organs of the state and their 
rank and file became auxiliary forces to the field 
armies and fleets in the fullest sense of the word. 
Yet they did not lose their nation-wide functions and 
responsibilities. 
It is worth noting that, in these and other com-
missariats, military ranks were conferred during 
World War II on a number of key personnel and, 
in some cases, well down into the ranks of the com-
missariat and subordinate personnel. Military rank 
was given the Commissar of the Armaments Indus-
try, for example, and to many members of the State 
Medical Service. Conversely, many of the outstand-
ing military personalities of World War II were 
elected to the Supreme Sovil!t. One, Marshal Bu-
denny, was a member of the Presidium as well. 
3. ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION 
In World War II, the numerous commissariats which 
direct the national economy were brought into direct 
services to the armed forces nearly as closely as the 
formally militarized commissariats. The recom-
mendations of the General Staff, as the chief agency 
for the planning and evaluation of field operations, 
and of the technical arms and services of the Red 
Army became the basis for State Defense Committee 
directives issued to those responsible for planning 
and administering all phases of war production. 
The mobilization sections, created with the first 
Five Year Plan of 1928, in the plants, factories, and 
installations of the economic commissariats, put 
their plans for conversion to war production into 
effect. They remained in close contact with the 
appropriate arm through specialized liaison officers. 
Horses and motor transport had been selected in 
all parts of the U. S. S. R. during peacetime for 
consignment to the armed forces in the event of 
war. These were checked every 6 months to de-
termine their readiness for transfer to the armed 
forces. 
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Coordination between commissariats was put on 
a more efficient footing through the institution of 
economic councils with extensive power over groups 
of industries and national resources. Six such eco-
nomic councils were formed, each generally com-
posed of the commissars of a number of related 
industries or trusts. The chairmen sit together as 
the Supreme Economic Council. 
The decisions of the Supreme Economic Council 
superseded those of the State Planning Committee, 
which had produced the Five Year Plans. (This 
change was instituted because no plan of compar-
able scope in time, or requiring as much time in 
preparation as the Five Year Plan, can be appro-
priate in the pressing years of a war for national 
survival.) The creation of the Supreme Economic 
Council, both a planning committee and a body 
representative of the chief industries and trusts, 
further guaranteed full-scale efficient management 
of the resources and production capacity of the na-
tion toward the needs of the armed forces. 
Further evidence of the Soviet realization of total 
war within the peacetime framework of the state is 
to be found in the system of universal pre-induction 
military training of the populace, whether subject t(l 
the draft or exempt. Within every organized unit 
of Soviet society, whether industrial, political, cul-
tural, or educational, there were representatives of 
the Red Army who were attached as instructors in 
military science. Instruction was graded appropri-
ately to the age, sex, and occupation of the people 
involved. Spare time, within very strict limits, was 
devoted entirely to such training in all parts of the 
U.S.S.R. 
Training programs were prescribed and adminis-
tered by the Red Army through its representatives. 
Over-all control of the various programs rested in 
the Commissariat of Defense, where the plans of the 
State Defense Committee, General Headquarters, and 
General Staff could best be applied to the military 
training of the populace. 
The absolute legal hegemony of the Red Army and 
Navy in their zones of operations in time of war 
also deserves mention. As a right established by 
Soviet law, the armed forces may, given a state of 
sufficient urgency, draft for their use any or all of 
the equipment and populace of any area of the 
U. S. S. R. This may be done without regard to 
existing laws, decrees, or directives. 
Close coordination also has characterized other 
relationships between the armed forces and the civil 
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economy. This is true of such affairs as the con-
struction of military facilities, the development of 
new weapons and equipment, and the handling of 
discharged soldiers and of pensions for veterans and 
the families of the dead and wounded. 
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It can be said without exaggeration that every 
element in the national economy and every person 
old enough to do his share is included within the 
national defense system of the Soviet Union in time 
of war. 
PART II. ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND, EARLY 1945 
Section I. THE STATE DEFENSE 
COMMITTEE 
1. POSITION AND FUNCTIONS 
The State Defense Committee, created 1 July 1941 
arid dissolved in September 1945, is the supreme gov-
ernmental body in time of war. In effect, it assumes 
the functions of both the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet and of the Council of Peoples' Commissars. 
Thus it has final authority over the armed forces 
and all the commissariats of the Soviet Union. 
The relationship of the State Defense Committee 
with the Supreme Economic Council, with other spe-
cial councils and committees of the government, and 
with the commissariats does not differ from that of 
the Council of Peoples' Commissars in normal times. 
For over-all control of the conduct of a war, how-
ever, the State Defense Committee issues directives 
on major issues of strategy directly to the General 
Headquarters, which controls the armed forces en-
gaged with the enemy. Thus the State Defense Com-
mittee bypasses the administrative machinery of mili-
tary commissariats in matters of operational strategy. 
2. COMPOSITION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The enormous range of powers vested in the State 
Defense Committee by virtue of its membership is 
clearly indicated by the titles of the following mem-
bers composing the committee: 
STALIN, Generalissimo: Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces, Chief of the General 
Headquarters, Chairman of the Council of 
Peoples' Commissars, Commissar of Defense, 
Chairman of the Politburo of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party. 
BULGANIN, General Armii (General, U. So) : 
Deputy Commissar of Defense, Vice Chair-
man of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, 
Chairman of the Council of Metallurgical 
and Chemical Industries, member of the 
Politburo of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party. 
MOLOTOV: Commissar of Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council, 
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Peoples' 
Commissars, member of the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. 
BERIYA, Marshal of the Soviet Union: Com-
missar of Internal Affairs and Chief of Troops 
of the NKVD, member of the Council of 
Peoples' Commissars, member of the Polit-
buro of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party. 
MALENKOV: Member of the Presidium of the 
the Supreme Soviet, member of the Politburo 
and Orgburo, Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party, head of the 
Central Administration for Personnel of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, 
President of the Committee for the Restora-
tion of Liberated Areas, member of the Coun-
cil of Peoples' Commissars. 
KAGANOVICH: Member of the Council of 
Peoples' Commissars, member of the Polit-
buro of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party, former Commissar of Trans-
portation, member of the All-Union Commit-
tee on Transportation. 
MIKOYAN: Commissar of Foreign Trade, 
member of the Council of Peoples' Commis-
sars, member of the Politburo of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party. 
VOZNESENSKI: Member of the Council of 
Peoples' Commissars, members of the Polit-
buro of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party, Chairman of the Council for 
Defense Industry. 
It will be noted that all members of the State 
Defense Committee are members of the Council of 
Peoples' Commissars and of the Politburo of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. 
The State Defense Committee is not equipped 
with a large staff. It relies upon the numerous com· 
mittees, councils, commissariats, and the General 
Headquarters for expert advice, for preparation of 
detailed plans, for recommendations, and for the 
implementation of its policy decisions. It may thus 
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properly be called a "committee," a small group of 
key leaders responsible for decisions of policy and 
affairs of state. 
Section II. GENERAL 
HEADQUARTERS 
1. POSITION AND FUNCTIONS 
The personal Staff of Stalin, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces, is known as the Stavka or Gen-
eral Headquarters of the Armed Forces. The Gen-
eral Headquarters of the Armed Forces translates 
the policy decisions of the State Defense Committee 
into military action and directs the prosecution of 
the war through the Chief of Staff of the Army and 
through the Commissariat and Staff of the Navy. 
The General Headquarters of the Armed Forces 
was formed to replace the Supreme Military and 
Naval Councils of earlier years in the joint and 
coordinated command of the Army and Navy. It 
looks to the General Staffs of the Army and Navy 
and to their commissariats for plans and recommen-
dations for carrying out major strategic operations 
and in questions of administration. 
The General Headquarters is not equipped with 
special staffs, nor is it divided into sections. The 
majority of its members are major chiefs of the 
armed forces command and administration. Thus 
the major staffs of the armed forces function as 
working staffs of the General Headquarters. 
Constitutionally, the Commissariats of Defense 
and Navy are subordinate only to the State Defense 
Committee. The General Headquarters has no 
direct authority over them. However, the members 
of the Headquarters exercise effective control over 
the administrative affairs of the armed forces by 
virtue of their appointments as deputy commissars. 
This dual appointment of key personnel assures close 
coordination of field command with administration. 
The GHQ is not a headquarters in the usual sense 
of the term. It is, like the State Defense Committee, 
a periodic meeting of the chief military leaders of 
the high command structure for the consideration of 
major strategic plans. 
2. COMPOSITION AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The General Headquarters consists of 12 to 14 of the 
top military leaders. They are selected so as to rep-
reSent the chief branches, arms, and services. 
The composition of the GHQ in early 1945 amply' " 
illustrates its power and scope and the technical 
qualifications of its members. It is important to 
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note that all members of the GHQ are members of 
the Communist Party. 
STALIN, Generalissimo: Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces, Commissar of Defense, 
etc. 
ZHUKOV (Chief of GHQ), Marshal of the 
Soviet Union: First Deputy Commissar of 
Defense, Commander of the First Belorussian 
Army Group. 
VASILEVSKI, Marshal of the Soviet Union: 
Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Deputy Com-
missar of Defense. 
KUZNETSOV, Admiral of the Fleet: Peoples' 
Commissar of the Navy, member of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party. 
NOVIKOV, Chief Marshal of Air Forces: 
Chief of the Red Army Forces, Deputy Com-
missar of Defense. 
TIMOSHENKO, Marshal of the Soviet Union: 
Deputy Commissar of Defense (formerly 
Commissar, then First Deputy Commissar), 
Inspector of Infantry, GHQ Coordinator of 
the Second and Third Ukrainian Army 
Groups. 
VOROSHILOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union: 
Member of the Council of Peoples' Commis-
sars and of the Politburo of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party, former mem-
ber of the State Defense Committee and 
Deputy Commissar of Defense, Commander 
in Chief of Partisans. 
SHAPOSHNIKOV, Marshal of the Sovi·et 
Union: Member of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party, formerly Chief of Staff 
of the Red Army, Deputy Commissar of De-
fense, Chief of the Historical Division of the 
General Staff. 
KHRULEV, General Armii (General, U. S.) : 
Chief of Rear Services of the Red Army, 
Deputy Commissar of Defense. 
VORONOV, Chief Marshal of Artillery: Chief 
of Artillery Troops of the Red Army, Deputy 
Commissar of Defense. 
FEDORENKO, Chief Marshal of Tanks and 
Mechanized Troops: Chief of Tank and Me-
chanized Troops of the Red Army, Deputy 
Commissar of Defense. 
BUDENNY, Marshal of Soviet Union: Mem-
ber of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 
Chief of Cavalry Troops of the Red Army, 
Deputy Commissar of Defense. 
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VOROBEV, Chief Marshal of Engineer Troops: 
Chief of Engineer Troops of the Red Army, 
Deputy Commissar of Defense. 
SHCHERBAKOV, General Polkovnik (Lieuten-
ant General, U. S.) : Head of the Main Politi. 
cal Administration of the Red Army, Deputy 
Commissar of Defense, Member of the Polit-
buro of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party, Secretary of the Moscow Com-
mittee of the Communist Party. 
3. SPECIAL ACTIVITIES 
Elements of the General Headquarters frequently 
are detached to supervise the conduct of major field 
operations. A member of the General Headquarters 
may assume command of an army group (front), as 
when Zhukov was made Commander of the First 
White Russian (Belorussian) Front for the conclud-
ing phases of the assault on Germany while still chief 
of the General Headquarters. 
Several of the members of the General Head-
quarters have been appointed as coordinators of the 
joint operations of two or more army groups 
(fronts) . Notable among these was Timoshenko, 
who supervised the advance of the Second and Third 
Ukrainian Fronts in the last months of the war. 
Groups of officers of the General Headquarters have, 
on occasion, even been detailed to supervise joint 
operations of two or more fronts in the field. Thus, 
they become an advance echelon of the General 
Headquarters, itself. 
The purpose of this detached service is the super-
vision of operations in order not only to assure exe-
cution of the plans of the Headquarters, but also to 
assure rapid, continuous, and objective reporting of 
the progress of campaigns. 
Another important factor is the authority over the 
Commissariats of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and 
State Security (NKGB) that is granted the general 
Headquarters. Although these units are not consti-
tutionally subordinate, the GHQ may issue direct 
orders to them in special cases which require imme-
diate action and are closely related to the conduct 
of operations. Neither commissariat is represented 
in the General Headquarters. 
Section III. CHIEF OF STAFF AND 
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED 
ARMY 
I. THE CHIEF OF STAFF 
In issuing the commands and directives of the Gen-
eral Headquarters to units of the army in the field, 
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the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army is 
chief executive officer for the Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces. 
The Chief of Staff is the command link between 
the General Headquarters and the Red Army in the 
zone of operations. The Chief of Staff also com-
mands all divisions of the General Staff ;;;r is reo 
sponsible for the preparation of operational plans 
by the staff and for reconnaissance operations or-
dered by the staff. 
A special responsibility of the Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff, of particular importance in time of peace, 
is the publication of the "Journal of Military 
Thought." This publication, probably the most in-
fluential of all Soviet military journals, is directed 
to present analyses of problems of military theory 
and ideology, of basic problems of organization of 
the armed forces, of strategy, and of operating tech-
niques. It also is directed to cover the analyses and 
discussion of coordination of arms, of the training 
of commanders for all arms, and of practical combat 
lessons. It also is to include extensive critiques of 
the accomplishments of the armed. forces of other 
nations. 
The Chief of the General Staff also is responsible 
for supervision of policy of the two highest military 
academies, the Frunze Academy (Command and 
General Staff School) and the Academy of the Gen-
eral Staff (War College). 
2. THE GENERAL STAFF 
a. Position. The General Staff of the Red 
Army is the highest advisory body to the Chief of 
Staff of the Red Army, to the Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces, and to his personal staff, the 
General Headquarters. Subordinated operationally 
only to the General Headquarters in time of war, it 
remains subordinate to the Commissariat of Defense 
for its own internal administration. Although the 
interests of the General Staff are primarily opera-
tional, it also exerts considerable influence upon the 
administration of the Red Army. 
h. Functions. The General Staff, in coopera-
tion with the staffs of the arms and rear services, is 
responsible for the preparation in detail of all opera-
tional plans for the Red Army. It also is specifically 
charged with ensuring effective coordination between 
arms and services at all levels. 
In common with the staffs of lower headquarters, 
the. General Staff maintains operations, intelligence, 
signal, and topographical divisions. It also main-
tains three divisions which are peculiar to the Gen-
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eral Staff. They are the Formations Division, which 
corresponds to the statistical control sections of lower 
staffs, but which appears to have much broader 
functions than the later in problems of organiza-
tional policy; the Fortified Areas Division; and the 
Historical Division, which is charged with the prep-
aration of critiques of operations and of recommen-
dations based upon them. 
c. Organization. The General Staff is organ-
ized into divisions as follows: 
The First (Operations) Division of the General 
Staff includes representatives of all the combat arms 
and the rear services. It is charged with the final 
preparation of operational plans for submission to 
the General Headquarters. The Operations Divi-
sion is responsible for the initial deployment of field 
forces in any area which is expected to become a 
zone of operations. 
The Operations Division also is charged with the 
immediate command of field units not subordinated 
to army groups or other field headquarters, i. e., 
GHQ units, certain units in transit from their mili-
tary districts to the combat zone, and a pool of offi-
cers with General Staff qualifications. 
As the need arises, the Operations Division is 
divided geographically into sections for each the-
ater of operations or areas for which General Staff 
plans are being prepared. Toward the close of 
World War II, there were at least five sections. 
These were designated "North," "Center," "South," 
"Far East," and "Partisans." There also are sections 
representing the artillery, mechanized, air and en-
gin~er arms, the rear services, and the personnel 
administration of officers of the General Staff. 
A branch of this division is believed to control 
the selection and use of ciphers, codes, and cover 
names, and to be charged with the preparation and 
execution of deception operations. 
The Second (Intelligence) Division of the Gen-
eral Staff is the highest agency for the collection, 
collation, and evaluation of positive information 
concerning the enemy. Counterintelligence is han-
dled by the Main Administration for Counterintelli-
gence in the Commissariat of Defense (see Part III). 
The Intelligence Division also is charged with 
command responsibility for reconnaissance plans 
and may prepare direct orders to the arms, services, 
and field commanders for execution of the plans. 
Prisoner-of-war and document exploitation is con-
trolled by the Intelligence Division. The employ-
ment of secret agents is a joint responsibility of the 
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Intelligence Division and the Commissariat of State 
Security (NKGB). 
The Intelligence Division also is responsible for 
the employment of signal intelligence, a responsibil-
ity that is shared by the Main Administration for 
Signal Troops and by the signal security services of 
the NKVD. The exact delineation of functions and 
responsibilities among the three agencies is not 
known. 
The Intelligence Division works closely with the 
Topographic Division on terrain intelligence and 
with the intelligence branches of the arms on intel-
ligence appropriate to each. 
The Intelligence Division is believed to be divided 
into five branches: information, operations (sabo-
tage, etc.), espionage, cadres (training), and inter-
nal administration. The information section con-
sists of at least six subsections : Western, Balkan, 
German, Far Eastern, Near Eastern, and Publica-
tions. The espionage branch' includes sections for 
espionage equipment, for signal intelligence, and 
for operations in each of the various areas of the 
world. 
The Third (Signal Communications) Division of 
the General Staff is charged with planning the signal 
facilities required for operations under considera-
tion by the General Staff. Its plans are believed 
not to extend to the detailed requirements worked 
out by the Main Administration for Signal Troops 
of the Commissariat of Defense (see Part III). Nor 
are the plans believed to cover the close coordina-
tion of the Main Administration for Signal Troops 
of the Commissariat of Defense with the Commis-
sariat of Signal Communications. The General Staff 
lacks command function in this field. 
The Fourth (Formations) Division of the Gen-
eral Staff is believed to perform the functions of the 
statistical control sections of lower staffs and to 
analyze current and proposed Tables of Organiza-
tion. 
The internal organization is not known, but the 
division deals with questions concerning the re-
quirements and systems of mobilization and re-
placement and with the process of selection and 
appointment of officers. 
In this connection, stress must be laid upon the 
fact that Soviet Tables of Organization, especially 
for infantry, are modified in accordance with basic 
changes in the strategic situation. 
During the 1942. defensive stage of the war with 
Germany, infantry formations were provided with 
additional weapons, especially mortars. Their trans.-
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portation allocations were reduced radically. With 
the resumption of offensive operations~ the organiza-
tion of infantry units again was changed. The plan-
ning of these changes is believed to have been the 
function of the Formations Division. 
The Formations Division does not, however, ad-
minister such changes. The actual administration 
of the mobilization and replacement processes· has 
been transferred to the Main Administration for 
Personnel (officers) and to the Main Administration 
for the Formation and Equipment of Units (enlisted 
men) of the Commissariat of Defense. 
The Topographic Division of the General Staff is 
responsible for the study of terrain, defense data, 
and for the preparation of maps and charts in co-
operation with the Intelligence Division. It super-
vises the topographic and mapping services of the 
Red Army. It also coordinates the survey work of 
the artillery, engineer, and air arms. The Topo-
graphic Division is charged with the production and 
supply of all types of maps to the Red Army in the 
field. 
The Fortified Areas Division of the General Staff 
plans the development of fixed defenses for strong-
points, strategic bases, cities, frontier passes, and 
certain larger border areas not under naval com-
mand. It also supports the Chief of Staff and the 
Operations Division in the command control of such 
areas not under the command of army groups or 
other lower headquarters. 
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The Historical Division of the General Staff is one 
of the most important of General Staff divisions. Its 
organization is not known, but it draws upon the 
most expert opinion available, including high repre-
sentatives of each arm and service, and maintains, 
under its exclusive control, field offices attached to 
Army Group and Army Headquarters. 
The Historical Division transcends the function 
indicated by its title. Its duties include the accu-
mulation and processing of field reports on strategy, 
tactics, and the employment of arms, weapons, and 
equipment. The recommendations of the Historical 
Division become the chief basis for changes in Red 
Army operational doctrines, Tables of Organization, 
equipment, and materiel specifications. Division 
recommendations also affected the appointment and 
removal of major field commanders. 
Application of the Historical Division's critques, 
covering every aspect of strategy, tactics, logistics, 
etc., emerged during World War II as a definitely 
established function of the General Staff, in which it 
achieved its greatest prestige and influence. I ts in-
fluence in this respect is expected to remain as great 
in peace as it was during war. 
During World War II approved modifications of 
Red Army practices repeatedly were executed within 
a few months after the critique and recommendations 
were prepared. The continuous study and rapid ap-
plication of combat lessons has been one of the 
greatest assets of the Red Army. 
PART III. COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENSE AND RED ARMY 
ADMINISTRATION 
Section I. COMMISSARIAT OF 
DEFENSE 
1. POSITION 
The Peoples' Commissariat of Defense, now renamed 
the Peoples' Commissariat of the Armed Forces, is a 
Union-Republican Commissariat, directly subordi-
nate to the State Defense Committee in time of war, 
and to the Council of Peoples' Commissars in time 
of peace. (There is little evidence that the "Union-
Republican" title is based on fact. Only two repub-
lics are known to have organized Commissariats of 
Defense.) 
The Commissariat relies upon the General Head-
quarters for direction in affairs directly. bearing 
upon the prosecution of war. This is not, however, 
a command subordination. It is based upon the fact 
that the Commissar 1 First Deputy Commissar, and 
certain of the other Deputy Commissars hold the 
ma j ority of positions in the General Headquarters. 
In technical and administrative policies, a third 
agency exerts a large measure of indirect control 
over the Commissariat during war. The recommen-
dations of the General. Staff, based on evaluation of 
battle experiences, become directives to the Commis-
sariat or its component administrations when ap-
proved by the General Headquarters and adjusted to 
suit the capabilities of the administrations involved. 
Other agencies, such as the Supreme Court and 
Communist Party, also exert direct control over ad-
ministrations which are charged with functions 
within the Commissariat. 
2. COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION 
The Commissariat proper consists of the Commissar 
of Defense (Stalin), the First Deputy Commissar of 
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Defense (Zhukov), and 10 or more deputy commis-
sars. The majority of the deputy commissars are 
heads of the arms or of other main administrations 
of the Red Army. In January 1945,8 of the 12 mem-
bers of the Commissariat were members also of the 
General Headquarters, held not less than the rank 
of General Polkovnik (lieutenant general) , and were 
officers of long standing in the Red Army. 
Directly subordinate to the Commissar and Dep-
uty Commissars are the Inspectorate of Infantry and 
18 "bureaus" for Red Army affairs. The "bureaus" 
are called "main administrations" and "administra-
tions." In addition, there are a number of main ad· 
ministrations which are subordinate to the air, artil-
lery, and rear services. 
Of the 18 main administrations and administra-
tions, 1 administration is concerned with the inter-
nal affairs of the Commissariat itself; 9 main ad· 
ministrations control Red Army arms and technical 
services; 4 main administrations supervise personnel, 
conscription, and training; 3 main administrations 
are responsible for political and legal supervision 
of Red Army personnel; and the Main Administra-
tion of the Chief of the Rear Services controls sup-
ply, maintenance, evacuation, and transportation. 
The heads of administrations generally are known 
as the chiefs of their respective arms or services. 
For example, the head of the Main Administration 
of Signal Troops is known as the Chief Marshal of 
Signal Troops of the Red Army. 
3. FUNCTIONS 
The deputy commissars are charged with the promul-
gation of basic regulations and administrative poli-
cies for the Red Army. As heads of administra-
tions, they are responsible for the coordination of 
the activities of their administration with the other 
administrations, particularly with those for training 
and political supervision. They also are charged 
with the close liaison which each administration must 
maintain with its corresponding commissariat of the 
civil economy and with the General Staff (fig. 6) . 
The academies and schools which prepare officers 
for duty in each arm or service are important re-
sponsibilities of the chief of the respective adminis-
tration. In addition, the publications of the arms 
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and services, which carry the power of directives, 
are particularly important responsibilities of the 
chiefs. 
It will be noted that there is no main administra-
tion for the infantry arm. Responsibility for this 
arm belongs to the Commissariat as a whole. The 
infantry arm is supervised only by the Inspector of 
Infantry, who is a deputy commissar. The Red 
Army considers the infantry a basic arm and the 
direct responsibility, at all levels, of the commander 
rather than of a subordinate chief of an arm. All 
strategy, tactics, and administration of the entire 
Red Army spring from, or are added to, basic inf~n­
try regulations. 
The Inspectorate of Infantry, although not an 
administrative agency, performs important func-
tions. They are illustrated by the specific subject 
matter of the "Military Bulletin," published by the 
Inspector. The mission of the Bulletin is to present 
"analyses, from current war experience, of the theory 
and practice of combat; analyses of combat training, 
especially in the fields of tactics and fire control; and 
discussion and instruction concerning organization, 
tactics, techniques, and military experience." 
The Affairs Administration handles all internal 
problems of the Commissariat. I t is charged partic-
ularly with "housekeeping" and personnel duties. 
Known divisions of the Affairs Administration in-
clude the following: 
Inventions Division. Guides research and 
coordinates the needs of the arms and their 
inspection of new equipment. 
Regulation Division. Prepares regulations 
applicable to the entire Red Army. 
Foreign Liaison Division. Provides liaison 
with representatives of other nations con-
ducting business with the Commissariat. 
Finance Division. Administers the finances 
of the Commissariat and of the personnel of 
its administrations. 
Economics Division. Administers the in-
ternal "housekeeping" affairs of the Commis-
sariat and administrations. 
Publications Division. Prints and distrib-
utes all publications of the Commissariat and 
administrations. 
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Section II. MAIN ADMINISTRATIONS 
OF ARMS AND TECHNICAL SERV-
ICES 
1. GENERAL 
The main administrations of the nme arms and 
technical services are organized, under their chiefs, 
into staff sections and administrations which vary in 
number according to need. 
The staff sections of each main administration 
form the staff of its respective Chief as commander 
of the arm or service. 
The chiefs of the artillery, air, tank and mechan-
ized, engineer, and cavalry arms are also members 
of the General Headquarters. Occasionally, they 
have direct control of the operation or deployment 
of units of their arm in the field. The staffs also 
assist the chiefs in these latter capacities. 
The staff sections appear to correspond to those 
of the General Staff and work in close coop~ration 
with them. In most cases, the staffs include sections 
for operations, intelligence, signal, communications, 
and statistical control organization. 
There are at least three administrations (in some 
cases, main administrations) within each of the 
main administrations of the arms and technical 
services. They administer the supply, combat train-
ing, and personnel affairs of their respective arms. 
Another element of a main administration is be-
lieved to be its Military Council, consisting of the 
chief (Commander), the chief of staff or head of 
the operations section, the head of the supply admin-
istration, and a political representative who is re-
sponsible to the Main Political Administration. The 
Military Council is a directive body with somewhat 
wider powers than are vested in the chief of the arm 
or service, alone. 
2. ARTILLERY 
a. General. Of all the specialized branches of 
the Red Army, none has been more highly develop~d 
nor has been surrounded with a greater tradition of 
emphasis and prestige than the artillery arm. 
The functions of the artillery arm embrace, in 
addition to those found in the other armies of the 
world, responsibility for the development and supply 
of all weapons and ammunition for every arm. Of 
necessity, they also include direction of training in 
the use and maintenance of everything that shoots, 
the preparation of pertinent technical and training 
manuals and materials, and a large share of the 
planning phase of all major operations. It is not 
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unusual to find an artillery officer, usually the Chief 
of Artillery of an appropriate staff echelon, placed 
in over-all command of all troops for an operation 
in which artillery is the major arm employed. 
The great weight of responsibility falling to the 
Commissariat of Defense concerned with artillery 
affairs and the complexity of administration involved 
are such that two main administrations have been 
formed to handle the arm. One of them is concerned 
with staff structure and the other with administrative 
structure. 
The two administrations perform the following 
functions: 
Coordination with the air forces of the develop-
ment of fire plans for major operations. 
Technical control and direction of the tactical 
employment, training of personnel, and sup-
ply activities associated with artillery, mor-
tars, and rockets, with the exception of self-
propelled artillery. 
Coordination with appropriate Commissariats 
of the development and supply of all weapons, 
including infantry and aircraft armament, 
and of all ammunition. Special engineer and 
chemical weapons and explosives, and air-
craft bombs do not fall within this jurisdic-
tion. 
All development and dissemination of survey 
and meteorological data for artillery and co-
operating arms. These functions are carried 
on in conjunction with the Topographic Di-
vision of the General Staff, the Meteorological 
Administration of the Main Administration 
of the Air Forces, and the Main Administra-
tion for the Hydro-Meteorological Services. 
Planning of artillery observation aircraft oper-
ations in conjunction with the air forces. 
h. Commander of artillery. The Chief :Mar-
shal of Artillery, ranking artillery officer of the Red 
Army, is head of the Main Administration of the 
Commander of Artillery, and probably is assisted by 
a Military Council. The office is separated both in 
command and in function~ from the Main Adminis-
tration of Artillery Troops. 
The Chief Marshal of Artillery, or "Commander 
of Artillery," is assisted by deputies for antiaircraft 
artillery, rockets, and probably for artillery observa-
tion aircraft. He is provided with a staff, including 
the usual branches for operations, intelligence, etc. 
The artillery Commander is charged with full respon-
sibility for the artillery academies, for the influential 
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"Artillery Journal," and for all institutions for re-
search and development of the artillery arm. 
c. Artillery troops. Most of the routine activ-
ities of the administration of the arm are delegated 
to the Main Administration of Artillery Troops. 
Organization is believed to include the following: 
Office of the Chief of Artillery Supply. 
Personnel Administration (officers). 
Combat Training Administration (enlisted 
men). 
Special Administrations: 
Field Artillery Administration. 
Tank Destroyer Artillery Administration. 
Antiaircraft Artillery Administration. 
Mortar Administration. 
Rocket Administration. 
Artillery Topographic Service Administra-
tion. 
3. AIR FORCES 
The Commander of the Air Forces of the Red Army 
is assisted by a Military Council and deputies for 
engineers, navigation, aerial gunnery, political af-
fairs, and probably others., including airborne troops. 
The Main Administration of the Air Forces, under 
his command, is responsible for: 
Development of fire plans in conjunction with 
the staff of the Chief of Artillery. 
Control over all the Red Army Air Forces. 
All aircraft development and supply matters, in 
cooperation with appropriate economic com-
missariats. 
All artillery spotting units and operations, in-
cluding photo-reconnaissance, photo-interpre-
tation, and topography, in conjunction with 
the staff of the Chief of Artillery. 
Publication of the "Air Force Journal." 
Direction and administration of the air acade-
mIes. 
All air transport arid evacuation, especially of 
the wounded, in cooperation with the Chief 
of the Rear Services. This includes opera-
tional control over the Civil Air Fleet. 
The training and operations of airborne troops, 
in conjunction with the Inspector of Infantry. 
These responsibilities are divided among staff 
sections, inspectorates, main administrations, and 
administrations of which the following are known: 
The Air Staff: 
Operations Section. 
Intelligence Section. 
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Ciphers Section. 
Statistical Control (organization) Section. 
Air Transport Section. 
Meteorological Section: 
General Inspectorate: 
Inspector of Fighters. 
Inspector of Ground-Attack Aircraft. 
Inspector of Bombers. 
Inspector of Sturman (Navigation, etc.} 
Inspector of Technical Affairs. 
Miscellaneous others. 
Administrations: 
Main Administration of Airborne Troops 
(probable) . 
Main Administration of the Civil Air Fleet. 
Main Administration of Rear Services and 
Supply. 
Main Administration of Engineer Services. 
Main Administration for Formation and 
Training of Units. 
Personnel Administration (officers). 
Sturman (navigation, etc.) Administra-
tion. 
Aerial Gunnery Service Administration. 
Administration of Signal Services. 
Administration of 'Medical Services (sub-
ordinate to the Main Administration of 
Medical Services under the Chief of the 
Rear Services). 
Internal Affairs Administration. 
Administration of Air Academies. 
(For further details, see Chapter XI.) 
4. TANK AND MECHANIZED TROOPS 
The Main Administration of Tank and Mechanized 
Troops is charged with control over the tank~ self-
propelled artillery, and motorized infantry forces of 
the Red Army; with the development and supply of 
tanks and armored equipment~ in cooperation with 
the appropriate commissariat; and with coordina-
tion of the employment and supply of motor trans-
port for motorized troops, in cooperation with the 
Chief of the Rear Services. It also is responsible 
for the publication of the periodical, "Journal of 
Tank and Mechanized Troops," and for the academy 
of the arm. 
Little is known of the internal structure of this 
administration. However, it does include the fol-
lowing: 
Office of the Chief. 
Technical Deputy to the Chief (Mechanical 
Engineer) . 
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Military Council. 
Staff (probable). 
Administrations: 
Tanks. 
Self-pro pelled artillery. 
Motorized infantry. 
Supply. 
Mechanical engineering. 
Personnel (officers). 
Training (enlisted men). 
5. CAVALRY 
The Main Administration of Cavalry is concerned 
with horse cavalry only. It works in close con-
junction with the Inspector of Infantry. The pe-
riodical of the latter is its only published organ. 
Organization of the Main Administration of Cavalry 
is believed to be comparable to that of other arms. 
6. ENGINEERS 
Only a few subdivisions of the Main Administration 
of Engineers are k~own. These include the admin-
istrations for combat engineers, ponton engineers, 
construction engineers, geological services, and 
construction of fortifications. Staff sections and 
administrations probably are similar to those of the 
other arms, hut fewer in number. 
This administration controls the Engineer Acad-
emy and publishes the "Military Engineer Journal." 
It performs, as do the others, all the training, sup-
ply, and development functions peculiar to the arm, 
including the following: 
Planning of engineer support for major opera-
tions, including sieges and river crossings in 
particular. 
Training of engineers. 
Supply (mines and demolition, construction 
and fortifications equipment) . 
Ponton and bridge construction and supply. 
Geological surveys in conjunction with the 
Topographic Division of the General Staff 
and the topographic service of the artillery 
arm. 
7. SIGNAL TROOPS 
The Main Administration of Signal troops is 
charged with all phases of the radio, telephone, tele-
graph, and postal services of the Red Army. It 
closely coordinates with the same services of the Com-
missariat of Signal Communications. . 
Research and development are charged to the 
Commissariat. The Administration is largely an 
operating agency for the sustaining of communica-
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tions between the General Headquarters and the 
field forces, and in the zone of operations. In the 
zone of the interior, all such responsibility is vested 
in the Commissariat alone. 
The Chief Marshal of Signal Troops also is, at the 
present time, Chief of the Signal Division of the 
General Staff. He formerly was concurrently Peo-
ples' Commissar of Signal Communications. 
The exact channels for coordination of the opera-
tions controlled by this administration with those 
of the Navy and of the Commissariat of Internal 
Affairs (NKVD), including the signal security oper-
ations of the latter, are not known. 
Internal organization is little known, but five 
administrations have been identified. They include 
telephope and telegraph, radio, postal services, en-
gineers, and signal supply. A small staff and other 
administrations are presumed to exist. 
8. HYDRO-METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES 
The Main Administration of Hydro-Meteorological 
Services was formerly a civil organization directly 
subordinate to the Council of Peoples' Commissars. 
During war, this service and the meteorological 
services of the Navy and of the Red Army have been 
coordinated under the control of the Main Adminis-
tration of Hydro-Meteorological Services. It is pos-
sible that the civil service may revert to its former 
status. 
The Main Administration is charged with all as-
pects of pro.curement and dissemination of meteoro-
logical data to military and other agencies. It is 
organized basically into a Main Administration and 
an Administration. The Main Administration co-
ordinates all the services involved with the demands 
of the agencies served, trains all personnel of the 
services, controls the manufacture of equipment 
through appropriate Commissariats, and controls the 
distribution of equipment to military units and to 
civil units in the military districts. An administra-
tion supervises the activities of stations in the mili-
tary districts. 
Internal organization is as follows: 
Main Administration. 
Chief of the Service. 
Military Council (probable). 
Staff. 
Deputy for Air Forces. 
Deputy for the Navy. 
Deputy for the Ground Forces. 
Artillery Section. 
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Chemical Section. 
Hydrological Section. 
Deputy for Civil Commissariats (prob-
able) . 
Central Forecasting, Hydrological, and 
other Institutes. 
Central Aerological and other observato-
ries. 
Publications Section (periodicals). 
Central Bureau of Standards. 
Personnel Administration. 
Supply Administration. 
Administration of Regional Services and Sec-
tions. 
Supervises and administers stations under 
the controls of the military districts. 
9. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE FORCES 
Little is known about the internal structure of the 
Main Administration ~f Antiaircraft Defense Forces 
(GUPVO). (For the position, fun.ctions, and com-
ponents of the Air Defense Force, see Part I.) 
The following agencies are believed to exist in 
the GUPVO: 
Office of the Chief. 
Military Council. 
Staff Sections. 
Deputies for: 
Antiaircraft Artillery. 
Fighter Forces. 
VNOS (early warning service) . 
NKVD (passive and incendiary defenses 
under control of the Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs, [NKVD]). 
Chemical Warfare Services. 
Administrations for: 
Personnel. 
Combat Training. 
Supply (special supply and coordination 
of supply from other arms) . 
Publications: 
"Chemistry and Defense." 
"Antiaircraft Defense Bulletin." 
Administration for coordination of Air De-
fense Force Headquarters in the military 
districts. 
10. CHEMICAL WARFARE TROOPS 
Very little is known about the Main Administra-
tion of Chemical Warfare Troops. The activities 
of the service were neither extensive nor worthy of 
particular note during World War II. Only in the 
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employment of smoke did the troops of the Chemi-
cal Warfare Service perform an important part in 
operations. 
Section III. REAR SERVICES 
1. CHIEF OF REAR SERVICES 
For the functions of the Chiefs of the Rear Serv-
ices and their specialized divisions at all echelons 
in the Red Army, see Chapter VII, Logistics. At 
commissariat level, these supply and service func-
tions are assigned to the main administrations and 
the administrations under command of the Chief of 
the Rear Services. 
The Chief of the Rear Services, with the rank of 
General of the Army, is a Deputy Commissar of 
Defense. He has a personal staff in addition to the 
specialized administrations under his control. The 
staff assists in the coordination of the various sup-
ply services and their administrations. It also han-
dles broad problems of supply and assists the Chief 
of the Rear Services with his duties as a member 
of the General Headquarters. 
2. ADMINISTRATIONS OF REAR SERVICES 
The Chief of the Rear Services and the main ad-
ministrations and administrations under his control 
are charged with all phases of Red Army logistics, 
except those specifically allotted to the arms and tech-
nical services. 
The Main Administrations and Administrations 
under his control are as follows: 
Central Administration of Army Transporta-
tion (rail). 
Main Administration of ' Motor Transport. 
Main Administration of Roads (construction 
and maintenance). 
Main Administration of Intendance (clothing, 
etc.) . 
Main Administration of Subsistence (rations). 
Main Administration of the Medical Service. 
Administration of the Veterinary Service. 
Administration of Motor Fuel and Lubricant 
Supply. 
Administration of Finance. 
Administration of Personnel Losses of Non-
commissioned Officers and Enlisted Men and 
for Relief of their Families. 
Office for publication of the journal, "Rear 
Area and Supply of the Red Army.'~ 
(For further information, see Chapter VII.) 
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Section IV. POLITICAL, PENAL, AND 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPER-
VISION 
1. GENERAL 
Three main administrations, constitutionally sub-
ordinate to the Peoples' Commissariat of Defense, 
are concerned with supervision of the loyalty and 
legal discipline of the Red Army. They are the 
Main Administration of Counterintelligence, the 
Main Administration of Military Tribunals, and the 
Main Political Administration. The basic lines of 
policy of all three of these administrations are pre-
scribed, not by the Commissariat, but by other 
agencies of the state. 
2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
In the establishment of the Main Administration 
of Counterintelligence, the Red Army is made re-
sponsible for the loyalty of all its personnel; for the 
security of the zone of operations, exclusive of rear 
areas, against penetration by enemy agents; and for 
the required personnel and organization. 
Close cooperation with the Commissariats of In-
ternal Affairs (NKVD) and State Security (NKGB) 
is mandatory, but the Administration is not opera-
tionally subordinate to either. 
Agencies subject to the control of this Adminis-
tration exist at all echelons of command in the field 
army, down to and including companies. 
3. MAIN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION 
The Main Political Administration of the Red Army, 
subordinate to the Commissariat, is the chief agenc~T 
of the Communist Party for control of the Red Army. 
It occupies a position of great power and influence. 
The Administration is best considered as the mili-
tary branch of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party, from which it receives its basic 
directives. 
Headed by a senior member of the Central Com-
mittee, it issues directives covering all political ac-
tivities in the combat zone and within the Army 
structure in all areas. Perhaps the most important 
function of the Administration is its supervisory con-
trol over all Party members in the Red Army and its 
reporting of their activities. 
The Main Political Administration is charged with 
strengthening the Party and Komsomol (Commu-
nist Youth or pre-Party) organizations in the Red 
Army, with psychological warfare and propaganda 
conducted by the army in the field, and with politi-
cal indoctrination of Red Army troops, partisans, 
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and the civil population of occupied areas. It also 
is responsible for a number of educational insti-
tutions, including the Lenin Political War Academy 
and the Engels Military-Political School. 
The training of political assistants to command-
ers, members of the Military Councils, at all eche-
lons and of political commissars (when the political 
commissar system is operative) is the exclusive re-
sponsibility of the Administration. 
The Main Political Administration is organized 
into a number of component administrations. Chief 
among these are those for organization and training, 
political propaganda, information, Komsomol, and 
Party members. 
4. MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
The activities of military tribunals at all echelons 
down to divisions, excluding only corps, are super-
vised, coordinated, and administered by the Main 
Administration of Military Tribunals. The head 
of this administration is a Chief Procurator of the 
U. S. S. R., titled the Chief Procurator of Military 
Tribunals. All procurators (attorney-generals) of 
subordinate military tribunals are appointed by the 
Chief Procurator, with the advice and approval of 
the Commissariat of Defense. 
The Chief Procurator is responsible to the Mili-
tary Collegium of the Supreme Soviet for the ap-
plication of Soviet law to military affairs and per-
sonnel. The members of the Collegium are ap-
pointed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet. 
The jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals ex-
tends only to offenses against the laws of the Soviet 
Union as interpreted or applied to military affairs. 
Military regulations and discipline which do not 
stem from the civil law and which apply only to Red 
Army personnel, are not within the sphere of the 
tribunals or of the Main Administration of Mili-
tary Tribunals. 
Section V. ADMINISTRATIONS FOR 
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING 
1. GENERAL 
The administration of personnel affairs, conscrip-
tion, training centers, schools and academies, the 
selection of officers and noncommissioned officers, 
and the administration of organizations for the mili-
tary training of civilians is shared by a large num-
ber of agencies at commissariat level. (For further 
details of this system, see Chapter II.) 
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However, four main administrations (with a 
fifth subordinated to one of the four) are especially 
charged with closely related responsibilities in this 
field. They are the Main Administration of Person-
nel and its subordinate, the Main Administration of 
Military Educational Institutions; the Main Admin-
istration for the Formation and Equipment of Units; 
the Main Administration for Universal Compulsory 
Military Training; and the Main Administration 
for Pre-Military Training. These administrations 
are directly responsible for all but the purely tech-
nical aspects of the activities of the military dis-
tricts. The latter are controlled by the arms and 
services. 
2. PERSONNEL 
The Main Administration of Personnel is concerned 
exclusively with officer personnel. It is charged 
with the maintenance of complete records on all 
officers in the Red Army, including their assign-
ments, military occupational specialties, schooling, 
and qualifications. It assigns and promotes all offi-
cers up to and including the grade of lieutenant col-
onel, except where such authority is partially 
delegated to the army group (front) Commander. 
The Main Administration of Personnel also is 
responsible for the activities of the Main Admin-
istration for Military Educational Institutions, be-
cause the latter is concerned primarily with officer 
replacements. 
3. MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The Main Administration for Military Educational 
Institutions (GUVUZ), already mentioned as being 
subordinate to the Main Administration of Person-
nel, is charged with over-all responsibility for all 
schools of the Red Army. Technical aspects of 
training in the arms are the responsibility of the 
appropriate main administrations. Administrative 
problems are handled by the military districts in 
which the institutions are located. 
Rates and standards for matriculation and grad-
uation of officers are set by the Main Administra-
tion of Personnel on the basis of directives from 
the General Headquarters, or, for minor adjust-
ments, from the Commissariat. 
4. FORMATION AND EQUIPMENT OF UNITS 
The Main Administration for the Formation and 
Equipment of Units (GUFUV) is concerned pri-
marily with the formation of units and formations 
from available personnel or by conscription in ac-
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cordance with the directives of the Commissariat. 
Tables of Organization and Equipment, worked 
out by the Formations Division of the General Staff 
and approved by the General Headquarters and the 
Commissariat (and the appropriate main admin-
istration if a unit of an arm is involved), are the 
basic directives for the GUFUV. Directives con-
cerning the rate of formation are developed by this 
Main Administration in conjunction with the Chief 
Administration for Military Educational Institu-
tions, which supplies officer personnel. 
In addition to the processes of mobilization and 
expansion of the Red Army, GUFUV is charged 
with the recruiting and equipping of trained re-
placements for field units. Both the formation and 
replacement processes are handled locally by the 
military districts, under the direct supervision of 
the Main Administration for the Formation and 
Equipment of Units. 
5. UNIVERSAL COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAIN-
ING 
The Main Administration for Universal Compulsory 
Military Training of the Citizens of the U. S. S. R. 
(Vsevobuch) is charged with enforcement of the 
State Defense Committee decree requiring military 
training for the duration of World War II for all 
citizens between the ages of 16 and 50. 
The decree applies to all persons not members 
of the armed forces. All civil organizations, such 
as factories, cultural societies, and agricultural com-
munities, are instruments for the application of the 
decree. 
This organization may have been dissolved at 
the end of World War II. 
6. PRE-MILITARY TRAINING 
The Main Administration for Pre-Military Training 
(literally, "for the Military Training of School 
Children") was organized during World War II to 
administer a program of universal physical and 
military training through the primary and secondary 
schools for children in the first 10 grades (7 to 16 
years of age) . 
Although the proportion of military training has 
been reduced since the end of the war, all school 
children of both sexes receive as much military 
training as is commensurate with their individual 
capabilities. Recruits with this training are pre-
pared to continue full-scale army training immedi-
ately after induction. 
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